In illiquid markets, option traders may have an incentive to increase their portfolio value by using their impact on the dynamics of the underlying. We provide a mathematical framework within which to value derivatives under market impact in a multi-player framework by introducing strategic interactions into the Almgren & Chriss (2001) model. Specically, we consider a nancial market model with several strategically interacting players that hold European contingent claims and whose trading decisions have an impact on the price evolution of the underlying. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium results and show that the equilibrium dynamics can be characterized in terms of a coupled system of possibly non-linear PDEs. For the linear cost function used in Almgren & Chriss (2001) , we obtain (semi) closed form solutions for risk neutral or CARA investors. Finally, we indicate how spread crossing costs discourage market manipulation.
Introduction
Standard nancial market models assume that asset prices follow an exogenous stochastic process and that all transactions can be settled at the prevailing price without any impact on market dynamics. The assumption that all trades can be carried out at exogenously given prices is appropriate for small investors that trade only a negligible proportion of the overall daily trading volume; it is not appropriate for institutional investors trading large blocks of shares over a short time span. The trading decisions of institutional investors are likely to move stock prices in an unfavorable direction and often induce signicant trading costs.
It is now widely recognized that (the lack of ) liquidity is a major source of nancial risk and there has been an increasing interest in mathematical models of illiquid nancial markets. Schoeneborn & Schied (2008) ) and the role of derivative securities including the problem of market manipulation using options (Jarrow (1992) , Kumar & Seppi (1992) ). In an illiquid market, derivative traders have an incentive to utilize their impact on the price dynamics of the underlying in order move the option value in a favorable direction 1 . It has been shown by Jarrow (1994) , for instance, that by introducing derivatives into an otherwise complete and arbitrage-free market, manipulation strategies with a risk free gain may appear, such as market corners and front runs. Schoenbucher & Wilmott (2000) discuss an illiquid market model where a large trader can inuence the stock price with vanishing costs and risk. They argue that the risk of manipulation on the part of the large trader makes the small traders unwilling to trade derivatives any more. In particular, they predict that the option market breaks down. Our analysis indicates that markets do not necessarily break down when stock price manipulation is costly as it is in our model.
While the aforementioned papers dier signicantly in their degree of complexity, they all focus on a single player framework. When multiple players are considered the analysis is typically conned to some form of stealth trading as in Carlin, Lobo & Viswanathan (2007) and Schoeneborn & Schied (2008) , where liquidity providers try to benet from the liquidity demand that comes from some large investor but no strategic interaction between liquidity suppliers and consumers is considered. In fact, so far only little work has been devoted to models with strategically interacting market participants. Vanden (2005) considers a pricing game in continuous time where the option issuer controls the volatility of the underlying but does not incur liquidity or spread crossing costs. He derives a Nash equilibrium in the two player, risk neutral case and shows that seemingly harmless derivatives, such as ordinary bull spreads, oer incentives for manipulation that are identical to those oered by digital options (p. 1892, l. 36). Gallmeyer & Seppi (2000) 1 Gallmeyer & Seppi (2000) provide some evidence that in illiquid markets option traders are in fact able to increase a derivative's value by moving the price of the underlying. consider a binomial model with three periods and nitely many risk neutral agents holding call options on an illiquid underlying. Assuming a linear permanent price impact and linear transaction costs, and assuming that all agents are initially endowed with the same derivative they prove the existence of Nash equilibrium trading strategy and indicate how market manipulation can be reduced.
We provide a general mathematical framework within which to value derivative securities in illiquid markets under strategic interactions thereby extending the work of Gallmeyer & Seppi (2000) in several directions. Specically, we consider a pricing game between a nite number of large investors (players) holding European claims written on an illiquid stock. Their goal is to maximize expected utility at maturity from trading the stock where their portfolio value at maturity depends on the trading strategies of all the other players, due to their impact on the dynamics of the underlying. Following Almgren & Chriss (2001) we assume that the players have a permanent impact on stock prices and that all trades are settled at the prevailing market price plus a liquidity premium. The liquidity premium can be viewed as an instantaneous price impact that aects transaction prices but not the value of the players' inventory. This form of market impact modeling is analytically more tractable than that of Obizhaeva & Wang (2006) which also allows for temporary price impacts and resilience eects. It has also been adopted by, e.g., Our framework is exible enough to allow for rather general liquidity costs including the linear cost function of Almgren & Chriss (2001) and some form of spread crossing costs. We show that when the market participants are risk neutral or have CARA utility functions the pricing game has a unique Nash equilibrium in the class of absolutely continuous trading strategies; existence results for more general utility functions are given for the one player case. We solve the problem of equilibrium pricing using techniques from the theory of stochastic optimal control and stochastic dierential games. We show that the family of the players' value functions can be characterized as the solution to a coupled system of non-linear PDEs. Here we use a-priori estimates for Nash equilibria; we prove that the system of PDEs has a unique classical solution with bounded derivatives. It turns out that the equilibrium problem can be solved in closed form for a specic market environment, namely the linear cost structure used in Almgren & Chriss (2001) and risk neutral agents. We use this explicit solutions to state some conditions which make manipulation unattractive or avoid it altogether. For instance, we show that when the agents are risk neutral no market manipulation occurs in zero sum games, i.e., in a game between an option writer and an option issuer. Furthermore, we nd that the bid ask spread is important determinant of market manipulation. It turns out that the higher the spread, the less benecial market manipulation: high spread crossing costs make trading more costly and hence discourage frequent re-balancing of portfolio positions. This paper is organized as follows: We present the market model in section 2. In chapter 3, we formulate the optimization problem, derive a priori estimates for Nash equilibria and prove the existence of a solution for one player with general utility function. We solve the multi-player case in section 4 for risk neutral and CARA agents. We use these solutions in chapter 5 to show how market manipulation can be reduced. Section 6 concludes.
2
The Model
We adopt the market impact model of Schoeneborn & Schied (2007) with a nite set J of agents, or players, trading a single stock whose price process depends on the agent's trading strategies. where we denote by X j t the number of stock shares held by player j ∈ J {1, ..., N } at time t ∈ [0, T ]. We write dX j t =Ẋ j t dt and callẊ j the trading speed of the player j.
2.1
Price dynamics and the liquidity premium Our focus is on valuation schemes for derivatives with short maturities under strategic market interactions. For short trading periods it is appropriate to model the fundamental stock price, i.e., the value of the stock in the absence of any market impact, as a Brownian Motion with volatility (σB t ). Market impact is accounted for by assuming that the investors' accumulated stock holdings N i=1 X i have a linear impact on the stock process (P t ) so that
with a permanent impact parameter λ > 0. The linear permanent impact is consistent with the work of Huberman & Stanzl (2004) who argued that linearity of the permanent price impact is important to exclude quasi-arbitrage 2 .
2 There is some empirical evidence that very large trades have a concave price impact but this observation needs further validation.
A trade at time t ∈ [0, T ] is settled at a transaction priceP t that includes an additional instantaneous price impact, or liquidity premium. Specically,
with a cost function g that depends on the instantaneous change Remark 2.1. In our model the liquidity costs are the same for all traders and depend only on the aggregate demand throughout the entire set of agents. This captures situations where the agents trade through a market maker or clearing house that reduces the trading costs by collecting all orders and matching incoming demand and supply prior to settling the outstanding balance
We assume with no loss of generality that g is normalized, i.e., g(0) = 0 and smooth. The following additional mild assumptions on g will guarantee that the equilibrium pricing problem has a solution for risk neutral and CARA investors. Assumption 2.2.
• The derivative g is bounded away from zero, that is g > ε > 0.
• The mapping z → g(z) + zg (z) is strictly increasing. The former is the cost function associated with a block-shaped limit order book. The latter can be viewed as a smooth approximation of the map z → κz + s · sign(z) which is the cost function associated with a block-shaped limit order book and spread s > 0.
Preferences and endowments
Each agent is initially endowed with a contingent claim H j = H j (P T ), whose payo depends on the stock price P T at maturity. Although it is not always necessary we assume that the functions H j are smooth and bounded with bounded derivatives H j p .
Remark 2.4. We only consider options with cash delivery. The assumption of cash delivery is key. While cash settlement is susceptible to market manipulation, we show in Section 5 below that when deals are settled physically, i.e., when the option issuer delivers the underlying, market manipulation is not benecial: the cost of acquiring at an increased price outweighs the benets from a possible higher option payo, due to an increase in the underlying.
We model the risk preference of the agent j ∈ J with a von Neumann -Morgenstern utility function u j and assume that her aim is to maximize her expected portfolio value at maturity from trading in the nancial market so the agent's optimization problem is given by:
The portfolio value consists of the trading costs − T 0Ẋ j tP t dt, the option payo H j (P T ) and the liquidation value value j (X Assumption 2.5. All agents optimize their utility assuming that 
We say that a vector of strategies Ẋ 1 , ...,Ẋ N is a Nash equilibrium if for each agent j ∈ J her trading strategy X j is a best response against the behavior of all the other players, i.e., if
In the following section we derive a-priori estimates for equilibrium trading strategies and use standard results from the theory of stochastic optimization to show that Nash equilibria can be characterized in terms of a coupled system of partial dierential equations (PDEs). For the special case of risk neutral and CARA investors we show that the system of PDEs has a solution so that a unique (in a certain class) equilibrium exists.
Equilibrium Dynamics and A-Priori Estimates
In this section we formulate the optimization problem (2.5) as a stochastic control problem, derive the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-equations, HJB for short, and transform it into a system of coupled PDEs. To this end, we choose the stock price P and the trading costs R j of the agent j ∈ J as state variables. They evolve according to:
For a given time t < T , spot price p and trading costs r the value function of the player j, dened by V j (t, p, r) sup
denotes the maximal expected portfolio value at maturity that the player can achieve by trading the underlying. The associated HJB-equation is
cf. Fleming & Soner (1993) . Here we have used v j r i ≡ 0 for i = j. Given the trading strategies X −j of all the other agents, a candidate for the maximizer c j =Ẋ j should satisfy
provided v j r j = 0. We sum up these equations over the set of players in order to get the following characterization for the cumulated equilibrium trading speed
. Plugging this solution back into (3.5) allows to compute the optimal strategy c j =Ẋ j in terms of v i p and v i r i as
This expression is well dened if v j r j = 0 because g > 0.
To conclude, we have turned the family of individual HJB-equations (3.4) into the following system of coupled PDEs for j = 1, ..., N :
where the coupling stems from the aggregate trading speedẊ
Solving the system (3.8) is delicate, to say the least. The problem is the non-linearity coming from the expressionẊ j g Ẋ * along with the implicit dependence ofẊ j on the derivatives v i p and v i r i and the fact that v i r i appears in the denominator. The latter problem can be coped with by assuming that (after a possible monotone transformation) the agents' risk preferences satisfy a translation property so that u r = 1. A large class of such utility functions can be linked to backward stochastic dierential equations but we choose not to embed our work into that line of research. We consider instead the case of risk neutral and CARA investors where the existence of a unique classical solution to the system (3.8) is guaranteed without any reference to backward equations. The proof uses the following a-priori estimates for the optimal trading strategies. It states that in equilibrium the trading speed is bounded. As a result, the agents' utilities from trading and the value function associated with their respective HJB equations along with (as we shall see) their derivatives are bounded.
Lemma 3.1. Let Ẋ 1 , ...,Ẋ N be a Nash equilibrium for problem (2.5). Then each strategyẊ j satises
Proof. Let 
Note thatẊ j +Ẋ −j ≥ 0 on A and thus g Ẋ j +Ẋ −j ≥ 0 due to Assumption 2.2. Furthermore,
The dierence in the payos is therefore strictly bigger than
This shows thatẊ j is bounded above on the set A. A symmetric argument shows that on the complement A c the optimal response is bounded below by −K. Furthermore, this implies that on A c the optimal response is bounded above bẏ
A similar argument yields thatẊ j is bounded below on A. This completes the proof.
Remark 3.2. These a priori estimates, together with the boundedness assumption on the payos H j , imply that the optimization problem (2.5) is bounded. Moreover, if a smooth solution to the PDE system (3.8) exists, it is bounded.
In the one player framework we can use a standard result from the theory of stochastic control to show that (3.8) admits a unique solution.
Proposition 3.3. Let N = 1 and for the terminal condition ψ(p, r) u(−r + H(p)) let ψ ∈ C 3 and let ψ, ψ p , ψ r satisfy a polynomial growth condition. Then the Cauchy problem (3.8) admits a unique classical solution in C 1,2 , which coincides with the value function V .
Proof. Due to Lemma (3.1), the optimal controlẊ can be chosen from a compact set. Thus, we can apply Theorem IV. 
In particular, V j r j ≡ −1 so the optimal strategies do not depend on the trading costs. In other words, the state variable r is redundant and we omit it in this section. We write
The HJB-equation (3.4) turns into
where we have used v j r j = −1. The optimal trading speed form (3.7) is given by
where the aggregate trading speedẊ * = N i=1Ẋ j is the unique solution to
The system of PDEs (3.8) therefore takes the form 
Existence and uniqueness of a solution to this one-dimensional problem can be shown using Theorem IV.8.1 in Ladyzenskaja (1968) . Once the solution is known, we can plug it back into (4.4) and get N decoupled equations. This technique is applied in the following section where we construct an explicit solution for linear cost functions. Proof. The optimal trading speed from (4.2) and the aggregate trading speed from (4.3) arė
Linear Cost Structure
Let us sum up the N equations from (4.4). This yields the following PDE for the aggregate value
with terminal condition v(T, p) = 
where v is given in Lemma 4.3 and N denotes the heat kernel.
In the preceding proof and in Corollary 4.5 we need the solution to a variant of Burgers' equation. We cite it in the following Lemma. is solved by
Proof. By means of a linear transformation we can reduce the problem to A = B = 1. This particular case is solved in Rosencrans (1972).
Numerical Illustrations
In the risk neutral setting, we were able to reduce the system of PDEs from the multi-player setting to the one-dimensional PDE (4.7) for the aggregate value function. This can be interpreted as the value function of the representative agent. Such reduction to a representative agent is not always possible for more general utility functions. In the sequel we illustrate the optimal trading speeḋ X(t, p) and surplus 3 of a representative agent as functions of time and spot prices for a European call options H(P T ) = (P T − K) + and digital option H(P T ) = 1 {P T ≥K} , respectively. We choose a linear cost function, strike K = 100, maturity T = 1, volatility σ = 1 and liquidity parameters λ = κ = 0.01. We see from Figure 1 that for the case of a call option both the optimal trading speed and the surplus increases with the spot; the latter also increases with the time to maturity.
Furthermore, the increase in the trading speed if maximal, when the option is at the money. For digital options the trading speed is highest for at the money options close to maturity as the trader tries to push the sport above the strike. If the spot is far away from the strike, the trading speed is very small as it is unlikely that the trader can push the sport above the strike before expiry.
3 By surplus we dierence between the representative agent's optimal expected utility v(t, p) and the conditional expected payo Et[H(PT )|Pt = p] in the absence of any market impact. with the remaining parameters as above. We see that the higher the spread, the smaller the trading speed and the surplus. This is intuitive as frequent trading, in particular, when the option is at the money, incurs high spread crossing costs. The same is true for xed transaction costs which also discourage frequent trading.
Risk Averse Agents
A second class which yields explicit results is those of exponential utility functions u j (z) = − exp −α j z for j = 1, ..., N , where α j > 0 is the risk aversion coecient. In this case the value functions satisfy
and thus V j r j = α j V j . We suppress the state variable r and write V j (t, p) V j (t, p, 0). As above, we rst show existence and uniqueness of a solution for a general cost structure. In a second step, we derive the closed form solution for the linear cost function in the single player framework. 
General Cost Structure
with terminal condition v j (T, p) = − exp −α j H j (p) . We apply the linear transformationṽ j − 
where the aggregate trading speedẊ * is the unique solution to
If we plugẊ * andẊ j back into (4.9), we get 0 =ṽ
(4.12)
We can show existence and uniqueness of a solution.
Proposition 4.4. Let H j ∈ C 2 b for each j ∈ J. The Cauchy problem 4.9 admits a unique solution, which coincides with the vector of value functions (up to an exponential transformation).
Proof. See appendix A.
Linear Cost Structure, Single Player
For the one player case with linear cost structure, we have an explicit solution:
Corollary 4.5. Let N = 1 and g(z) = κz. Then the Cauchy problem 4.9 admits a unique solution, which can be given in closed form.
Proof. The maximizer in (4.9) is c =Ẋ = λ 2κṽ p and the Cauchy problem (4.12) turns into
with terminal condition v(T, p) = H(p). This is Burgers' equation. Its explicit solution is given in Lemma 4.3.
Numerical Illustrations
Let us conclude this section with numerical illustrations. We simulated the system (4.8) for two players. Figure 5 shows the aggregate optimal trading speedẊ (0, p) +Ẏ (0, p) and the surpluses v j (0, p) − E u j (H(P T )) |P 0 = p for time t = 0 and dierent spot prices p ∈ [95, 105] for the European Call option H(P T ) = (P T − K) + ; we assume that Player 1 (blue) is the option writer and Player 2 (red) the option issuer. We chose the strike K = 100, maturity T = 1, volatility σ = 2 and liquidity parameters λ = κ = 0.01 and risk aversion parameters α 1 = 0.01, α 2 = 0.01 (plain), respectively, α 1 = 0.001, α 2 = 0.1 (dashed). Since Player 1 has a long position in the option, she has an incentive to buy the underlying; for the same reason Players 2 has an incentive to sell it (Panel (b)). Our simulations suggest that the dependence of the equilibrium trading speed on the agents' risk aversion is weak (Panels (b) and (c)) and that overall the option issuer is slightly more active than the option writer. Furthermore, we see from Panel (d) that the issuer benets more from reducing her loss than the writer benets from increasing her gains. This eect is due to the concavity of the utility function and increases with the risk aversion. Proof. The solution v to the Cauchy problem (4.7) with terminal condition
is bounded uniformly in N . Equation (4.6) yields
Let us modify the preceding setting a little. Again, Player 0 issues a product H and does not intend to manipulate the underlying, while her competitors do. More precisely, assume that player 0 splits the product H into pieces and sells them to N risk neutral competitors, such that each of Proof. As in the preceding corollary, the assertion follows from equations (4.7) and (4.6).
The preceding results indicate how an option issuer can prevent her competitors from manipulation. One strategy is public announcement of the transaction: the more informed liquidity suppliers on the market, the smaller the impact on the underlying. A second strategy is splitting the product into pieces; the more option writers, the less manipulation. Let us conclude this section with a surprisingly simple way to avoid manipulation: using options with physical delivery.
Remark 5.4. Calls, Puts and Forwards with physical delivery do not induce stock price manipulation.
Proof. Consider a risk neutral agent who owns Θ > 0 Call options with physical delivery and strike K. As above, we denote by X her strategy in the underlying. At maturity, she exercises 0 ≤ θ ≤ Θ of her Call options. Problem (2.5) turns into:
where the rst term in the rst line describes the expected trading costs in [0, T ] and the liquidation value of θ + X T stock shares at maturity. The optimal trading strategy is X ≡ 0. The same holds true for Put options and Forward options with physical delivery.
Conclusion
We investigated the strategic behavior of option holders in illiquid markets. If trading the underlying has a permanent impact on the stock price, the possession of derivatives with cash delivery may induce market manipulation. We showed the existence and uniqueness of optimal trading strategies in continuous time and for a general cost function; in the one player framework for general utility functions, and in the multi-player case for risk neutral as well as CARA investors.
Moreover, we showed how market manipulation can be reduced.
Our work may be extended in several directions. Foremost, we derived our results under 
A An Existence Result
In this section, we prove Propositions 4.1 and 4.4 where the PDE (4.4) in the risk neutral setting is a special case of the system (4.9) for risk averse agents, with α j = 0 for each j. In order to establish our existence and uniqueness of equilibrium result, we adopt the proof of Proposition 15.1.1 in Taylor (1997) to our framework. After time inversion from t to T − t both systems of PDEs are of the form
and F = F 1 , ..., F N is of the form
HereẊ * andẊ j are given implicitly by (4.2) and (4.3). The initial condition is
We rewrite (A.1) in terms of an integral equation as
and seek a xed point of the operator Ψ on the following set of functions:
We set Y C b . Note that X and Y are Banach spaces and the semi-group e tL associated with the Laplace operator is strongly continuous on X, sends Y on X and satises
for some C > 0, γ < 1 and t ≤ 1. Furthermore, the nonlinearity F is locally Lipschitz and belongs to C ∞ . Indeed, the map a →Ẋ * (a) is C ∞ , due to the implicit function theorem with rst derivative
where the denominator is positive due to Assumption 2.2. The cost function g is C ∞ by assumption. In particular, the assumptions of Proposition 15.1.1 in Taylor (1997) are satised.
The a-priori estimates of Proposition 3.1 yield that, if a solution v to (A.1) exists, it is bounded in the sense v X ≤ K. Therefore, we dene
and choosing K large enough we may assume that the initial condition satises H ∈ X K .
We are now ready to prove existence and uniqueness of a solution to (A.3). Proposition 15. Proof. 1. For n = 0, there is nothing to prove. Pick n ∈ N such that nτ < T . By induction, we can assume that there is a solution v (n) ∈ X K on the time horizon [0, nτ ]. In particular, the initial condition for the next recursion step h (n) v (n) (nτ ) is in X K .
2. Fix δ > 0. We construct a short time solution on the following set of functions:
To this end, we rst show that Ψ : Z (n+1) → Z (n+1) is a contraction, if τ > 0 is chosen small enough.
For this, let τ 1 be small enough such that for t ≤ τ 1 and any v ∈ X K we have
Here we used that e tL is a continuous semigroup and v X ≤ K. In particular, for v = h (n) :
For v ∈ Z (n+1) , the derivative v p is uniformly bounded in the sense v p ∞ ≤ h (n) X + δ ≤ K + δ. Hence, we only evaluate F on compact sets. By assumption, F is locally Lipschitz.
In particular, F is Lipschitz on compact sets. In other words, there is a constant K 1 such that for any v, w ∈ Z (n+1) we have
This, together with the boundedness assumption on e tL , yields . This proofs that Ψ is a contraction in Z (n+1) , if τ is small in the sense 0 < τ min{τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 }.
Note that the time step τ does not depend on n. It is the same in every recursion step. This completes the proof.
